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The Shifting Sands of Deterrence Theory and the Sixth Circuit's
Trouble with Suppression in United States v. Fofana*
INTRODUCTION
After a century of evolution, the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule may be in danger of extinction. Several recent
Supreme Court decisions have threatened to dramatically curtail the
suppression remedy,' yet the Court has not expressly abandoned it.2
Instead, the Court has increasingly focused upon an element not
inherent in the rule itself: proportionality.' This focus on
proportionality shifts away from the traditional rule-exception
paradigm and attempts to balance the social interests protected by
enforcing Fourth Amendment rights against the social costs incurred
by allowing guilty criminals to benefit from excluded evidence.'
Recent Supreme Court decisions also reflect a narrow view of
the exclusionary rule's deterrence value, primarily assessing the
deterrent effect on individual law enforcement actors instead of
applying the rule as part of a larger social scheme.s By abandoning
* © 2014 K. Dawn Milam
1. See generally Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply where law enforcement reasonably relied on binding
appellate precedent in conducting an unreasonable search or seizure); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
applies in cases of negligent law enforcement error); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586
(2006) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in cases of knock-and-announce
violations).
2. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he continued
operation of the exclusionary rule ... is not in doubt.").
3. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 ("[T]he benefits of deterrence must outweigh
the costs. 'We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every
circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.' " (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Patrol v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 368 (1998))).
4. See, e.g., id. (describing the "possible benefit" as deterrence and the social cost as
allowing "guilty and possibly dangerous defendants [to] go free"); see also Ronald J.
Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as Direct
Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 241, 243 (2010) ("For a small violation of
Fourth Amendment rights, a dangerous and guilty criminal can obtain a tremendous
benefit.").
5. See, e.g., Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28 ("In a line of cases beginning with United
States v. Leon, we also recalibrated our cost-benefit analysis in exclusion cases to focus the
inquiry on the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue. The basic insight of the Leon
line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion var[y] with the culpability of the
law enforcement conduct at issue. When the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly
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the broader theory of systemic deterrence that underlies early
exclusionary rule jurisprudence,6 the Court potentially undervalues
the benefits of exclusion. As a result, the proportionality test skews
heavily to allow exceptions, further decreasing the rule's deterrence
value.
United States v. Fofanal is the Sixth Circuit's recent attempt to
weigh deterrence against social costs to determine whether the
suppression remedy should apply. Fofana could be interpreted a
number of ways, including as confirmation that the exclusionary rule
is useless as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.' A more
generous reading of Fofana, however, suggests that the opinion
exemplifies the incompatibility of a remedy justified by deterrence
and a narrow, individual-centered theory of deterrence.
This Recent Development examines Fofana as an illustration of
a flawed conception of deterrence and the resulting imbalance of the
proportionality analysis. Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I
presents the essential background to the proportionality analysis and
Fofana's central facts and holdings. Part II critiques Fofana's
deterrence assessment and distinguishes deterrence from punishment.
Part III examines individual and systemic deterrence and posits that
systemic deterrence is the best rationale to empower the exclusionary
rule. Part IV argues that the individual deterrence rationale, within a
negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is
strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. But when the police act with an
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct
involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force
.... " (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 254 (2013) (describing Leon's exemption of judicial conduct as
"remov[ing] an effective device for reviewing the Fourth Amendment decisions of
magistrates and providing constitutional guidance to judges and law enforcement officials
generally").
6. See Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, On Rollercoasters, Submarines, and Judicial
Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 941, 955-56 (noting the theory of "systemic
deterrence" underlying the early jurisprudence of the exclusionary rule).
7. See David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court's Contemporary
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 29-56
(2013) (explaining that the Court's current deterrence rationale has led to problematic
doctrines in Fourth Amendment law, including the good faith exception, the cause
requirement, and the standing requirement).
8. 666 F.3d 985 (6th Cir. 2012).
9. Cf Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: The Fading "Exclusionary Rule,"
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-
analysis-the-fading-exclusionary-rule/ (stating that the goal of the Court's majority is to
ensure that less evidence is suppressed).
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vigorous proportionality test as applied in Fofana, fundamentally
undermines the rule itself.
I. ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A. Hudson's Framework for Proportionality in Applying the
Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment declares "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.""o Because the Constitution is
silent on redress for Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme
Court has developed the principle known as the exclusionary rule:
subject to certain exceptions, illegally obtained evidence cannot be
admitted at trial against the victim of the unreasonable search or
seizure." Traditionally, the exclusionary rule has been applied to
suppress evidence primarily or secondarily derived in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, a concept known as the "fruit of the poisonous
tree." 2 Evidence that might be excluded under the fruit of the
poisonous tree principle may still be admissible under one of several
recognized exceptions, such as the independent source," inevitable
discovery,1 and attenuation doctrines."
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. For comprehensive treatment of the exclusionary rule's decisional history and the
expansion and contraction of the suppression doctrine over time, see generally 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed.
2012 & Supp. 2013-2014); MACLIN, supra note 5.
12. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) ("Under this Court's
holdings, the exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct
result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be
derivative of an illegality or fruit of the poisonous tree." (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
13. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) ("When the challenged evidence has
an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse
position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.").
14. See id at 434 ("[E]vidence . . . was properly admitted on the ground that it would
ultimately or inevitably have been discovered even if no violation of any constitutional or
statutory provision had taken place.").
15. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) ("We need not hold
that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is
whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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In Hudson v. Michigan,16 the Supreme Court observed that
tainted evidence could still be admissible if the "considerable" costs
of suppression outweighed the gains of deterring unlawful conduct."
Under the majority's proportionality analysis, suppression depends
on an assessment of the relative strength of deterrence and the
availability of alternate remedies.'8 The cost-benefit approach has
been applied in Supreme Court exclusionary rule cases since Justice
White introduced this balancing test in Alderman v. United States.1 9
But the tone of Justice Scalia's language in Hudson arguably
expanded proportionality's significance by asserting that suppression
"has never been applied except 'where its deterrence benefits
outweigh its "substantial social costs." ' "20 By describing the
proportionality analysis as an inquiry independent of traditional
exceptions, Hudson may invite lower courts to apply an expansive
cost-benefit analysis that will forbid suppression in numerous
contexts.
B. Fofana's Central Facts, Holding, and Rationale
In November 2007, a man opened two bank accounts at U.S.
Bank in Cincinnati, Ohio.2 1 As proof of identity, he provided a
passport with the name "Ousmane Diallo." 22 The IRS deposited tax
refunds belonging to other individuals into "Diallo's" accounts
between February 2008 and January 2009.23 Upon discovering the
fraud, U.S. Bank blocked the accounts, notified the IRS, and filed a
police report. 24 According to the government, an investigation of the
accounts began sometime before January 31, 2009.25
16. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
17. See id. at 594-95 (noting that these costs include the release of "dangerous
criminals," a "massive remedy" for what the Court considered a relatively trivial
violation).
18. See id. at 596-99 (citing alternate remedies such as civil suits and police
professionalism).
19. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969); see also MACLIN,
supra note 5, at 264 ("White's opinion in Alderman introduced this [cost-benefit
balancing] methodology, and it has been a mainstay of the Court's analysis in suppression
cases ever since.").
20. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Patrol v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
21. United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 986 (6th Cir. 2012).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
2014] 1429
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That day in January, at the Port Columbus International Airport,
a passenger named Fode Fofana was flagged for additional
Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") screening.26
Although passengers may be flagged for additional screening for
several reasons, including "travel characteristics identified by the
TSA as indicating potential security risks," there is no information to
indicate why Fofana was selected.27 After Fofana had been patted
down and his luggage checked for explosive residue and weapons,
TSA agent Tarah Stroud continued to search through fourteen to
sixteen envelopes uncovered in the search.28 Three of these envelopes
contained passports, each with a different name, including "Ousmane
Diallo." 29 Agent Stroud admitted that she was not searching the
envelopes for weapons or explosives, but rather was "looking for
contraband."3 0 Law enforcement officers subsequently arrested
Fofana.31 Using the information received in the TSA search, U.S.
Bank concluded that "Ousmane Diallo" was an alias belonging to
Fofana.32
After he was indicted on three counts of possession of a false
passport and two counts of bank fraud, Fofana filed a motion to
suppress all evidence obtained by Agent Stroud, arguing that her
search of the envelopes was illegal.3 3 The district court granted the
motion, recognizing that "the extent of the search went beyond the
permissible purpose of detecting weapons and explosives and was
instead motivated by a desire to uncover contraband evidencing
ordinary criminal wrongdoing."34 The district court granted a second
motion to prohibit introduction of all evidence with Diallo's name-
including the bank records-as fruit of the poisonous tree, concluding
that the relationship between Fofana and his alias could not clearly be
established through any exception.
The Sixth Circuit reversed and declared the bank records
admissible.36 Struggling (and arguably failing) to find an independent
26. Id. at 987.
27. See United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
28. Id. at 859-60.
29. Id. at 860.
30. Id. at 860-61.
31. Id. at 861.
32. United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 987 (6th Cir. 2012).
33. Id.
34. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
35. See Fofana, 666 F.3d at 987.
36. See id. at 987-88, 991.
1430 [Vol. 92
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source exception,37 the court rested its decision primarily upon a cost-
benefit analysis similar to the one modeled in Hudson." While the
Sixth Circuit did not cite to Hudson or expressly indicate that it would
apply any standard outside the traditional exceptions, three of
Fofana's four rationales address deterrence and social policy
concerns. First, the majority found that suppression served little
deterrent effect when "the illegal search was not directed to the
crime, or even the type of crime" at issue.39 Second, suppressing the
passports uncovered in the airport search provided "an alternate,
more direct deterrent."40 Finally, suppressing the bank records would
"unduly burden[] the truth-seeking function of courts by effectively
precluding relevant and legitimately obtained evidence from ever
being used."41 A closer inspection of the Fofana majority's assessment
provides a helpful backdrop for evaluating the role of deterrence in
the proportionality approach to exclusion.
II. FOFANA's DETERRENCE ANALYSIS: A DOUBTFUL ANSWER TO A
GOOD QUESTION
Ever since United States v. Calandra42 confirmed that deterrence
is the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule,43 courts have
applied this rationale as a basis either to uphold suppression or create
an exception. Recognizing that deterrence may not be effective in all
circumstances," the Roberts Court in particular has applied a
37. The Sixth Circuit's first rationale relies upon the fact that the government already
possessed the records bearing Diallo's name. See id. at 987-88. The majority analogized to
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), and to United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463
(1980), to characterize the bank records as independently obtained evidence with an
independent capacity to identify Fofana as Diallo. See Fofana, 666 F.3d at 988-90.
However, the court stopped short of specifically holding that the bank records fell within
either of the Ceccolini or Crews exceptions. See id.
38. Compare Fofana, 666 F.3d at 991 ("Balancing this interest against the
comparatively weak Fourth Amendment interests in this case compels the conclusion that
the bank records be admitted."), with Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006)
("[Tihe exclusionary rule has never been applied except 'where its deterrence benefits
outweigh its substantial social costs.' " (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Patrol v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 363 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. See Fofana, 666 F.3d at 988-89.
40. See id. at 988-90.
41. See id. at 988, 990.
42. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
43. See id. at 348 (describing the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
44. See Eugene Michael Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A
Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAC. L.J. 33, 37-38 (1979) (noting situations where
deterrence measures will not prevent unlawful conduct).
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vigorous deterrence-focused analysis to determine whether the
rationale supports excluding important evidence.45 Justice Scalia
rejected exclusion as a deterrent to knock-and-announce violations in
Hudson, asserting that "we cannot assume that exclusion in this
context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was
necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago."' Justice
Roberts wrote in Herring v. United States47 that the degree to which
deterrence justifies the suppression remedy "varies with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct," 48 holding that the
exclusionary rule "is not an individual right and applies only where it
'result[s] in appreciable deterrence.' "49 However, Fofana illustrates
just how precarious a deterrence analysis becomes as courts struggle
to determine what deterrence is, to whom it should apply, or how
broadly or narrowly the factual circumstances should be interpreted
to render a conclusion.
The Fofana majority concluded that deterrence was minimally
served, reasoning both that the illegal TSA search was not connected
to the bank fraud and that suppressing the passports provided the
most effective deterrent.0 To support the first claim, the court
analogized to United States v. Ceccolini,s' where the Supreme Court
relied on the attenuation doctrine to admit witness testimony
obtained by a police officer following an illegal search.52 In Ceccolini,
a police officer entered a flower shop to converse with his friend, an
employee at the shop.53 The officer picked up and examined an
envelope containing cash and policy slips.5 4 Without explaining to his
friend what he had found, the officer asked her to identify the owner
of the envelope." The Supreme Court determined that because the
police officer did not enter or search with any intention of discovering
45. See MACLIN, supra note 5, at 325-27, 337-43 (examining the deterrence rationales
and implications in Hudson, Herring, and Davis).
46. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006).
47. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
48. Id. at 143.
49. Id. at 141 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984)) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 2012).
51. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
52. See id. at 279. To support its decision, the Court pointed to the substantial interval
of time between the search and the live testimony, as well as the free will of the witness.
See id. The Court emphasized the distinction between a live witness and physical evidence
in declining to suppress the testimony. See id. at 278-79.
53. Id. at 269-70.
54. Id. at 270.
55. Id.
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either illegal activity or a witness, "[a]pplication of the exclusionary
rule in this situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect on
[such] behavior.""6 In Fofana, the Sixth Circuit conceded that the
TSA agent admitted to searching for contraband, which the court
identified as the passports.5 ' However, the court reasoned that the
relevance of the passports-the link between Fofana and his alias-
was "quite remote from what could reasonably have been expected to
result from the search."" The court concluded that suppressing the
link would have a "minimal deterrent effect in the future."59
The Sixth Circuit's comparison to Ceccolini is flawed for two
reasons. First, as Judge Moore noted in her dissent, the TSA agent's
activities were clearly "aimed at implicating Fofana in criminal
wrongdoing. By finding the passports .. . the agent succeeded in this
aim regardless of whether the agent specifically foresaw and intended
this exact result."' Second, the court overlooked the dramatically
disparate nature of an administrative TSA search and a police
officer's happenstance discovery from a friend." Judge Moore
highlighted this disparity by emphasizing the greater deterrence
purpose necessitated by the administrative function of the TSA
search and the number of travelers subjected to it daily62:
Given the incidental, casual encounter in Ceccolini between the
officer and his friend, . . . it is easy to see how the Court was
confident that there was no future misconduct to deter. In
contrast, . . . [g]iven the broad discretion already granted to
TSA agents to search the traveling public, it is important to
deter unconstitutional conduct and to ensure that TSA's broad
powers are not improperly exploited for law-enforcement
purposes.'
As Judge Moore concluded, a more accurate assessment of
suppression's true deterrence value would consider the TSA agent's
knowingly wrongful conduct, as well as the TSA's broad scope of
power and the potential for abuse.
56. See id. at 279-80.
57. See United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 2012).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 994 (Moore, J., dissenting).
61. Compare Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 269-70 (describing a police officer's happenstance
discovery of information through a friend), with United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d
857, 859-61 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (detailing the illegal TSA search).
62. See Fofana, 666 F.3d at 994 (Moore, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
2014] 1433
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The majority then adopted the Hudson strategy of evaluating
other remedial measures' to determine that suppressing only the
passports, but not the link to Fofana's alias, provided "an alternate,
more direct deterrent."65 Such a theory makes some sense, at least
superficially: the unlawfully discovered passports could not be used as
evidence, whereas the bank records, obtained independently and
legally, were part of a "second, more remote" investigation.'
However, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning not only misses the
essence of the Hudson Court's approach, it also creates an
implausible distinction between tangible evidence and its relevance.
In Hudson, the Court made the controversial assertion that
alternative remedies to the exclusionary rule, specifically civil suits
and police professionalism, were better deterrents for a knock-and-
announce violation than suppression." Regardless of whether the
Hudson Court was correct in its evaluation of truly alternate
remedies, the Fofana majority took a more radical approach by
separating a suppression remedy into degrees.' Even though the
passports should be suppressed, the court reasoned, the significance
of the passports was still admissible.69 For deterrence purposes,
though, the distinction between the physical evidence and its
relevance is illusory because the government retains an incentive to
obtain the information illegally. Even if such a distinction can be
made, the central problem is that both the passports and the link to
Fofana's alias allow for "successful prosecution based on the fruits of
this search," which in turn incentivizes law enforcement to engage in
future misconduct.70
A failure to fully appreciate the underlying incentives for law
enforcement subverts both of Fofana's deterrence rationales. If
deterrence is to be weighed in a fact-bound inquiry, it is critical that
courts first understand how deterrence functions. While it seems that
64. Compare Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596-99 (2006) (evaluating alternative
remedial measures to suppression-civil suits and increased professionalism in police
forces), with Fofana, 666 F.3d at 989-90 (analyzing the effectiveness of suppressing the
passports-the tangible evidence found during the illegal search-rather than the bank
records).
65. Fofana, 666 F.3d at 988.
66. See id. at 990.
67. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 596-99; see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 1.2(c) (noting
the inadequacies of proposals to replace or limit the exclusionary rule).
68. See Fofana, 666 F.3d at 989-90.
69. See id. at 988; see also id. at 992 (Moore, J., dissenting) ("It is the establishment of
the connection between Fofana and the alias Ousmane Diallo that is important for our
analysis-not the prior legal possession of the bank records themselves.").
70. See id. at 994 (Moore, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 921434
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the Fofana court conceived of deterrence as a kind of punishment,"
deterrence in the exclusionary rule context is more precisely the
absence of incentives. 72  As one commentator explained,
"[e]videntiary suppression has never been punitive in character ....
Deterrence results from removing incentives for future illegalities-
i.e., depriving the government of illegally obtained advantages."7 3
Understood as a forward-looking device to prevent future
wrongdoing, a proper deterrence analysis could neither ignore the
exploitation of the TSA's broad powers nor divest evidence of its
significance.
This crucial distinction between punishment and incentives has
significance beyond semantics. A broad understanding of deterrence
operates from the view that legislative bodies and law enforcement
agencies have a duty to encourage and abide by constitutional
restraints. The court's role, under a broad deterrence theory, is to
remove any incentive to disregard these restraints and thereby
prevent future violations within the system.74 Thus, "application of
the exclusionary rule on a systemic basis seeks to teach by example
throughout all law enforcement agencies."" The aim of the
exclusionary rule is not to punish or specifically deter police "in the
same way that the criminal law deters illegal behavior by civilians,"
but rather to operate as a disincentive for illegal law enforcement
conduct.76
III. THE REAL VALUE OF EXCLUSION: SYSTEMIC VERSUS
INDIVIDUAL DETERRENCE
The Sixth Circuit's difficulty with its deterrence analysis
demonstrates the confusion resulting from the Supreme Court's
questionable deterrence theories and applications. The primary
question surrounding the deterrence rationale is whether the
71. See id. at 989-90 (majority opinion) (stating that the deterrent effect of the
passport exclusion is "particularly powerful since it effectively eliminates the possibility of
convicting Fofana of the first three counts of his indictment").
72. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-57 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[Olne general fallacy in the reasoning of critics of the exclusionary rule is the belief that
the rule is meant to deter official wrongdoers by punishment or threat of punishment....
[T]he exclusionary rule ... depends not upon threatening a sanction for lack of
compliance but upon removing an inducement to violate Fourth Amendment rights.").
73. James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues,
9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381,401 (2011).
74. See Marsh, supra note 6, at 956.
75. Id.
76. See MACLIN, supra note 5, at 98 (explaining that the decision to describe "the rule
as a deterrent was a strategic and linguistic mistake").
2014] 1435
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exclusionary rule should deter illegal conduct at a systemic or an
individual level.77 Early exclusionary rule jurisprudence envisioned a
systemic purpose for the remedy." But beginning shortly after
Calandra and continuing through Herring, the Burger, Rehnquist,
and Roberts Courts have applied a backward-looking factual analysis
to determine whether the suppression remedy satisfied its deterrent
function in specific circumstances.79
The Fofana majority employs this narrow, backward-looking
approach as well by focusing on the TSA agent's expectations. For
the Sixth Circuit, the fact that the bank fraud investigation was not
the object of the TSA search was critical to its holding that the
deterrence value of suppression would be minimal." By framing the
bank fraud investigation as entirely independent of the illegal search,
the court was able to deflect its analysis away from the fact that the
TSA agent admittedly and illegally searched for "contraband."" The
fact that the TSA agent's search was "aimed at implicating Fofana in
criminal wrongdoing" and was successful even without intending this
precise result became irrelevant for individual deterrence purposes
once this questionable distinction between the search and the
investigation had been made.82
77. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On
Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PiTr. L. REV. 307, 342-47 (1982)
(explaining the competing views of deterrence in the context of the good faith exception);
The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARv. L. REV. 111, 135-37 (1995)
(critiquing the Court's failure to appreciate the systemic-deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)).
78. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665, 669-71, 709-10 (1970) (noting that the exclusionary rule was designed to
affect the behavior of not just an individual officer, but of "all law enforcement officials
and society at large").
79. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) ("To trigger the
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid
by the justice system."); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) ("If court employees were
responsible for the erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would
not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction. First, as we
noted in Leon, the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring
police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 918 (1984) ("We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary rule can have
any deterrent effect when the offending officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief
that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.").
80. See United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 2012).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 994 (Moore, J., dissenting).
1436 [Vol. 92
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Justice Brennan, dissenting in 1975 against the emergence of a
subjective deterrence inquiry, argued that the deterrence rationale
should not be so limited:
Deterrence can operate in several ways. The simplest is special
or specific deterrence-punishing an individual so that he will
not repeat the same behavior. But "[t]he exclusionary rule is
not aimed at special deterrence since it does not impose any
direct punishment on a law enforcement official who has
broken the rule. ... The exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting
the wider audience of all law enforcement officials and society
at large. It is meant to discourage violations by individuals who
have never experienced any sanction for them."83
Dissenting again a few years later in United States v. Leon,' one of
the first cases to narrow the scope of deterrence, Justice Brennan
reiterated that "the chief deterrent function of the rule is its tendency
to promote institutional compliance with Fourth Amendment
requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies generally.""
Seen from a broader perspective, the exclusionary rule serves to
remedy the dispute that arises "not between the arresting officer and
the defendant, but rather between the defendant and the state."8 6
Thinking of deterrence as a systemic force changes the
framework of the debate. The central question is no longer whether
"there is some specific deterrent consequence which is to be gained
by excluding the illegally obtained evidence. Rather, it is whether in
such circumstances there is something to be lost ... by admitting the
evidence acquired in violation of the [F]ourth [A]mendment."I Thus,
in assessing the costs to society, the Fofana majority overlooked the
important fact that the real burden imposed upon courts derives from
the Fourth Amendment itself." The government is not justified in
using "relevant and trustworthy evidence"89 it has obtained illegally.
The "truth-seeking function of the courts"9 0 must encompass all the
truth. It is not enough to consider only that a criminal defendant will
83. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-57 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Oaks, supra note 78, at 709-10).
84. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
85. Id. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. See LaFave, supra note 77, at 350.
87. Id. at 347.
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
89. See United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 2012).
90. Id.
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walk away completely free when it is equally true that the
government has violated a constitutional boundary.
Whereas a narrow view of deterrence tends to look backward at
specific actors in a factual inquiry, a broader view looks forward to
preventing future constitutional impropriety among all entities, not
just those in the instant case. This systemic view better reflects the
scope and focus of the Fourth Amendment itself:
Rather than mandating that the police shall not undertake
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Amendment declares
that the right of the people to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated. The focus of the
Amendment is on the rights of the citizen, not the conduct of
the police. Indeed, at the time of the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, the "police" as we know them did not even exist.
Thus, a narrow application of the exclusionary rule that focuses
only on deterring police misconduct, not on preventing future
violations of the Amendment, is inconsistent with the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment, and fails to enforce its full command."
Under a systemic deterrence framework, the characters in a criminal
case play only a minor role. The suppression remedy is applied to
deter the justice system itself, not just to sanction an individual
officer.9 2 The individual officer's actions and motivations become
irrelevant. Likewise, the defendant becomes only an "incidental
beneficiary"93 in the hope of reducing future violations and securing
more citizens in their persons, effects, homes, and papers.
One scholar compares this theory of deterrence with the colorful
example of branding televisions to make them less valuable if stolen
and resold:
Of course a branded television set may nonetheless be stolen by
someone who does not notice it is branded, or who thinks that
he can sell it even with the brand, or who simply wants to watch
the Superbowl on it. But at least the effort to depreciate its
worth makes it less of an incitement than it might be.94
The deterrent effect, then, is achieved through principled boundaries
that remove the incentive to disregard constitutional limits. It vests
the responsibility for constitutional safeguards in "those who
91. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 77, at 135-36.
92. See supra note 78.
93. LaFave, supra note 77, at 346.
94. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 431 (1974).
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formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement
them" in the hope that legislative bodies and enforcement agencies
will adopt better procedures and professional practices."
While opinions differ over the actual deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule, there is some reason to believe that Mapp v.
Ohio,"6 which applied the exclusionary rule to the states,' did
instigate better police professionalism practices. Justice Scalia wrote
in Hudson that the past half-century had seen an "increasing
professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal
police discipline."" Consequently, the analysis for the rule's
application should "consider more than its ability to alter the conduct
of the arresting police officer. Instead, the exclusionary rule should be
invoked whenever the police (or prosecutors) are able to encourage
the prevention of future Fourth Amendment violations at an
acceptable cost, regardless of the source of the original error." 99 The
full deterrence potential of the exclusionary rule, and possibly the
rule's survival as a non-illusory legal remedy, relies on a broader
understanding of the rule's purpose and deterrence value.
IV. EXCEPTIONS AND DETERRENCE: WHEN SOLUTIONS CREATE
THE PROBLEM
A developing and "unnecessarily restrictive"" view of the
exclusionary rule's deterrence value, along with the Court's
increasing propensity to apply a proportionality test,'0 has resulted in
the proliferation of exceptions to the exclusionary rule.102 Fofana
illustrates the uncertainty that results from an analysis that heavily
favors exceptions, which in turn decreases deterrence. More judicial
clarity is essential to achieve systemic deterrence and empower the
exclusionary rule to function as an effective remedy.
95. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) ("[T]his demonstration that our
society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to
encourage [these groups] ... to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value
system.").
96. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
97. See id. at 655.
98. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
99. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 77, at 138.
100. Id. at 140.
101. See Stanley Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable
Good Faith," 36 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1518 (1983).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (introducing the good
faith or reasonable mistake exception); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984)
(introducing a possible public safety exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984)
(introducing the inevitable discovery exception).
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The deterrence theory supporting the exclusionary rule has
shifted over time. Early exclusionary rule cases took a broad view of
deterrence, explaining that "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to
individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the
Federal Government and its agencies.""0 ' Mapp v. Ohio explained
that exclusion deters by " 'compel[ling] respect for the constitutional
guaranty ... by removing the incentive to disregard it.' "'0 The
systemic concept of deterrence is closely aligned with an interest in
the role of the judicial system and law generally to "nurtur[e] respect
for the right through creation of a system that in no way supported or
encouraged the right's violation.""os However, two cases decided
shortly after Calandra demonstrate a marked shift away from a
systemic deterrence rationale. United States v. Leon, which created
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,106 and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard,' a companion case, explicitly based their
holdings on the culpability or good faith of the individual actor.10
Recently, Herring v. United States narrowed the deterrence analysis
to focus on law enforcement culpability as a dispositive factor,
explaining that "[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct
must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter
it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system."109
Justice Brennan cautioned the Leon majority that the "shifting
sands of the Court's deterrence rationale" were creating "a curious
world where the 'costs' of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom
to exaggerated heights and where the 'benefits' . . . are made to
disappear with a mere wave of the hand."1 o Indeed, the individual-
deterrence proportionality test now skews significantly in favor of
admitting evidence and has subsequently allowed numerous
103. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see also Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 210 (1960) (applying the rule from Weeks).
104. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
105. See Ingber, supra note 101, at 1537. For a comprehensive discussion of the
exclusionary rule and deterrence prior to Calandra, see Oaks, supra note 78, at 709-12.
106. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
107. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
108. See id. at 989 (noting that "[t]he officers in this case took every step that could
reasonably be expected of them"); Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20 (reasoning that suppression
would not deter "objectively reasonable law enforcement activity" because "the officer is
acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances").
109. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
110. Leon, 468 U.S. at 929-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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exceptions to be read into Fourth Amendment law.11' Creating yet
another exception for knock-and-announce violations, the Court
affirmed in Hudson that exclusion is a "last resort, not our first
impulse." 12
The Sixth Circuit applied a Hudson-like proportionality test in
Fofana to deny the suppression remedy."' However, unlike Hudson
or other similar Supreme Court precedent, Fofana assessed only the
factual circumstances without clearly holding that a specific
exception-old or new-applied."4 It is accordingly difficult to
determine exactly how the Sixth Circuit is applying or modifying the
exclusionary rule. One possibility is that Fofana extends the Hudson
proportionality test to apply as a case-by-case analysis that
independently determines exclusion, regardless of whether the factual
circumstances fit into an existing exception. Another possibility is that
Fofana represents the emergence of a new exception, one that allows
the relevance of illegally obtained evidence to be applied to prior,
legally acquired evidence. A third possibility is that Fofana is simply a
casualty of the tangled and unsettled implications of Hudson.
Regardless of the Sixth Circuit's rationale, Fofana illustrates the
uncertainty that results from a vigorous application of a
proportionality test that ignores the systemic component of
deterrence. As courts have applied the test to deny the suppression
remedy in various Fourth Amendment contexts, they have created
"[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
distinctions.""' Fourth Amendment doctrine may be virtually
incomprehensible to law enforcement agencies and " 'literally
impossible of application by the officer in the field.' "116 The
exclusionary rule thus becomes porous, increasingly stripped of any
111. See Rychlak, supra note 4, at 248 (citing examples to demonstrate that American
jurisprudence itself has "blunted the [deterrence] impact of the exclusionary rule by
creating numerous exceptions").
112. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
113. See United States v. Fofana, 666 F.3d 985, 989-91 (6th Cir. 2012).
114. See id. at 987-91.
115. LaFave, supra note 77, at 320.
116. Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (quoting United States
v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)); see also Ingber,
supra note 101, at 1545 ("The deterrence problem lies not with the rule, but rather with its
judicial administration. Admittedly, the Court has made difficult its responsibility of
finding a remedy for [F]ourth [Almendment violations by erroneously focusing on the
rule's deterrent value rather than on its ability to remedy the constitutional violation, and
then by negating that deterrent value through unclear opinions.").
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deterrence value and further skewing the proportionality test to allow
more exceptions.
The robust application of proportionality to create numerous
exceptions is therefore directly antithetical to the purported goal of
deterrence."' If the exclusionary rule is to survive as a meaningful
remedy, the proportionality assessment must be recalibrated to weigh
systemic deterrence and generate predictable guidelines for law
enforcement officials. Had the Fofana majority upheld the district
court's ruling suppressing both the passports and the connection to
Fofana's identity, the Sixth Circuit would have reinforced the
message that law enforcement agencies should have nothing to gain
from knowingly unlawful conduct. Instead, the Fofana decision
perpetuates the "subtle nuances and hairline distinctions" that erode
parameters and increase incentives for unconstitutional conduct by
the TSA and other government agencies."'
To achieve deterrence, the law surrounding the exclusionary rule
is "more in need of greater clarity than greater sophistication."" 9 The
best way to support the exclusionary rule's deterrent value "is not to
treat the constitutional violations with indifference, but rather to
clarify [F]ourth [A]mendment standards through opinions drawing
simple and understandable 'bright lines' for police conduct."'20 The
ambiguity in Fofana's approach illustrates the need for judicial clarity
that will enable officers to clearly understand and fulfill their
constitutional responsibilities. 2 '
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's Fofana opinion reveals the shortcomings
implicit in a conceptually flawed deterrence rationale. The
exclusionary rule's systemic-deterrent potential is arguably the rule's
most effective guard against future constitutional violations. The
broad, systemic theory of deterrence encourages a broad audience of
law enforcement and legislative entities to decrease incentives for
misconduct and improve professional practices.
However, the Supreme Court's current understanding of
deterrence focuses almost exclusively on a narrow application that
assesses individual impropriety in a backward-looking, factual
117. See supra notes 45, 111 and accompanying text.
118. See LaFave, supra note 77, at 320.
119. Id. at 321.
120. Ingber, supra note 101, at 1545.
121. See id.
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inquiry. 122 This limited view shifts the analysis away from the privacy
protections of the Fourth Amendment to consider only the actions of
the individual actors. Furthermore, when applied in a proportionality
test, the individual-deterrent theory easily skews the test in favor of
exceptions.123 When courts apply the proportionality test more
vigorously, as the Fofana court did, the resulting exceptions further
undermine the deterrence value of the exclusionary rule.
The Fofana opinion reveals the uncertainty and inevitable
contradiction that result from assessing the systemic-deterrent
exclusionary rule through an individual-deterrent test for
proportionality. For the exclusionary rule to realize its full potential
as a remedy for constitutional violations, courts must be willing to
recalibrate the proportionality assessment to incorporate a broader
view of deterrence. A systemic theory of deterrence that looks
forward to preventing future violations and imposes reasonable and
understandable limits on law enforcement is necessary to preserve a
functional remedy that adequately secures the promises of the Fourth
Amendment.
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